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I. INTRODUCTION

The conflict between the ethnic Sinhalese and the Tamils in Sri Lanka is
one of the prominent ethnic problems in the world today. Sri Lanka is an island
nation located in the Indian Ocean south of the Indian subcontinent. Its
population of approximately eighteen million is comprised of of three major
social groups. According to the 1981 census, which was the last proper
headcount undertaken, Sinhalese constitute 74.6 percent, and Tamils form 18.1
percent, of the total population.' A vast majority of the Sinhalese are religiously
Buddhists. On the other hand, the Tamils are mostly Hindus. Muslims, who
constitute 7.4 percent of the total population, includee both Tamil-speaking and
Sinhala-speaking Muslims.' However, as a religious minority the Muslims in
Sri Lanka have developed a distinct identity different from that of the Sinhalese
and the Tamils.3 Apart from these major social groups, there are small numbers
*
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Most members of the Muslim population, the third largest social group in the country, speak
Tamil but do not consider themselves as part of the Tamil community. Complexity of the Muslim status in
the country lies in the fact that it neither belongs to Sinhalese nor Tamil ethnic groups with large number of
especially urban Muslims embracing Sinhalese as their language and medium of education. Since, however,
the Muslims in Sri Lanka have developed a distinct Muslim identity based on religion, they are considered
as a separate social group. Theoretically, the Muslims remain neutral in the conflict. In practice however, their
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of indigenous people and Burgers. Christianity is professed by Sinhalese,
Tamils, and Burgers, and it is the religion of approximately 8 percent.
The two major ethnic groups, the Sinhalese and the Tamil, are in conflict
over territorial claims. The Tamils are in a war against the state of Sri Lanka for
a separate state in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island that they
claim is their "traditional homeland."4 Although the confrontation between
these groups could be traced to a historical and pre-colonial era, the postindependence period witnessed intense conflict and a war. The Sinhalese and
the Tamils are two different ethnic groups with distinct characteristics.
Linguistically, the Sinhalese speak Sinhala, which is described as an Indo-Aryan
language. Tamil, which is spoken by ethnic Tamils, is Dravidian. The Tamils
live mostly in the Northern and Eastern parts of the island while Sinhalese are
concentrated in all other provinces, although the ethnic war has severely altered
the demographic patterns in the recent past.
Sri Lanka was ruled by three western colonial powers (Portuguese, Dutch,
and British) for almost four centuries. At the end of the British rule there
emerged a Christianized, educated, and English-speaking elite comprised of
members of both ethnic groups. This group represented not only cordial ethnic
relations but also a successful forum for constitutional reform for the thenCeylon. 5 Differences began to emerge in the early 1920s and culminated in the
mid-1980s with violent expression and the struggle for a separate state for the
minority Tamils.6
The Tamil separatist movement resulted from a demand for greater Tamil
autonomy in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Tamil
dissatisfaction with the national politics of Sri Lanka, then called Ceylon, was
expressed even before the island nation was granted independence in 1948. The
cry for greater autonomy that provided the foundation for the separatist
movement gained force with the emergence of S.J.V. Chelvanayakam,7
considered by many to be the founding father of Tamil nationalism.
Chelvanayagam's movement for regional autonomy was fundamentally a
nonviolent struggle very much modeled on the Gandhian way of satyagraha.
The nonviolent struggle, which lasted for about thirty years, not only failed to
produce any substantial results in favor of the Tamil but in later years forced the

4.
For further details, see TULF, Tamil United Liberation Front Towards Devolution of Power in
Sri Lanka - Main Documents, August 1983 to October 1987 (1988) (Tamil United Liberation Front, Madras).
J.A. Wilson, S.J.V.CHELVANAYAKAM AND THE CRISIS OF SRI LANKAN TAMIL NATIONALISM,
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radical elements among the Tamils into the forefront of the national struggle!8
This state of affairs was in a sense caused by the belief of the Sri Lankan State,
as well as in later years the belief of Tamil militants, that excessive violence
resolved conflicts.
The vicious cycle of violence was perpetuated by the actions and reactions
of the parties involved in the conflict, and the conflict turned into an intense
war. The war, which has claimed tens of thousands of lives in both sides of the
spectrum, is fought by the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamils Eelam-the major fighting force among the Tamils. Because both
parties lack the power to impose a military solution on the other and lack
confidence on peaceful means to achieve their goals, the war has continued for
about eighteen years without any signs of peaceful solutions.9
Because the predicament in Sri Lanka, apart from its internal implications,
is highly dangerous regionally as well as internationally, a substantial academic
attention is paid to analyzing the causes, consequences, and ways to deal with
the conflict. These studies, however, either embrace a historical descriptive
method or take one factor as the basic cause of the conflict and focus on that
particular element. For example, economic factors are most often analyzed as
the major cause of the conflict.'0 This study, however, argues that psychology
of the people is the fundamental factor for this conflict, and that all other factors
influence the shape of that psychology.
H1. SOCIAL CUBISM

Social Cubism provides a comprehensive tool to look at ethnic conflicts
and understand the multiple forces behind them. Therefore, it is a useful
framework for conflict analysis." Moreover, Byrne and Carter consider "the
social cube of conflict as having six interrelated facets or forces: history,
religion, demographics, political institution and non-institutional behavior,
economics, and psychocultural. These six facets or social forces combine to
produce patterns of inter-group behavior."' 2 This article, therefore, analyzes the
Sri Lankan conflict using the social cube as the framework. This chapter,
however, does not embrace all the six forces as provided by the original cubism
framework, because the Sri Lankan conflict requires a slightly modified
framework for a better understanding of the conflict.
8.
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One facet of the original cubism framework is demography. In Sri Lanka,
although demography plays a prominent role in the origin of the conflict, it is
very closely involved with geographic factors inside as well as outside of the
island. Therefore, it is imperative to give equal weight to the geographical
factors as well. However, because demographic and geographic factors are not
two independent variables but are very much intertwined, I replace demography
in the original cubism model with "geo-demography." This enables the
researcher to consider geographic and demographic factors equally.
The term "politics" or "political" is not only much-debated in scholarly
literature but still remains vague as a concept. Byrne and Carter in 1996,
although they did not define the "political facet" of the cube, discuss boundaries
and terrorism as political factors. 3 In this article, I take as political factors (1)
(political) institutions and (2) constitutions. The original cubism framework is
insufficient for the Sri Lankan conflict, as it does not provide space for
discussion of the ethnic factors that form one of the fundamental facets in this
conflict. Byrne & Carter apply Social Cubism to the Northern Ireland and
Quebec conflicts that are primarily religion-based conflicts. 4 Therefore, it is
understandable that they used religion as a facet in their analysis. While the Sri
Lankan conflict is primarily ethnic, it has a religious angle to it. In order to
accommodate these different facets, I consider psychology separately from
culture, and I expand civilization to include ethnic, racial, religious and cultural
factors.
In essence, my cubism model includes the following six facets: (1) Geodemography (geography and demography), (2) History, (3) Economics, (4)
Politics (constitutions and institutions) (5) Civilization (ethnic, racial, religious
and cultural), and (6) Psychology.
11I. GEO-DEMOGRAPHY

I have argued elsewhere that the principal cause of conflict between the
Sinhalese and the Tamils in Sri Lanka is the "fear of extinction," intertwined
with suspicion, and superior and inferior complexities. These factors will be
analyzed in detail under the sub-title "psychology." However, the psychological
factors have been deeply influenced by other facets of Social Cubism. In that
sense, the geography and demography of the country have played a crucial role
in escalating the conflict between the protagonists.
As far as the demographic distribution of the country is concerned, the
Sinhalese and the Tamils are the two major social groups. However, there are
internal divisions within these groups. The Sinhalese are divided into (1)

13.
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14.

Id.
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Kandyan Sinhalese and (2) Low Country Sinhalese, depending on the
geographical location of the people. Divisions between these groups were
obvious and clear in the pre-independence period. However, after the
independence these differences have largely disappeared.15 The Tamils, on the
other hand, are divided into two social groups: 1) the "Ceylon Tamils" (or now
the "Sri Lankan Tamils") who consider themselves the original inhabitants of
Northern and eastern regions; and 2) the so-called "Up-country Tamils" (or
"Tamils of recent origin") who were brought to the country by the British
colonial administration to work in the tea plantations. Up-country Tamils are
concentrated mainly in central Sri Lanka and urban areas such as Colombo, the
capitol city. In spite of the commonalties between the Sri Lankan Tamils and
the Up-country Tamils, they are officially considered two different groups. The
Up-country Tamil do not have a direct role in the conflict. Therefore, when
referring to "Tamil" in this article, I mean the Sri Lankan Tamils.
When Sri Lanka was granted independence by the British in 1948, the
Tamils enjoyed absolute majority in the Northern and Eastern provinces of the
country, which constitute nine provinces in total. 6 The Tamils not only
considered the Northern and Eastern provinces as their homeland but also had
pushed for greater regional autonomy for Tamil majority areas even before
independence-they were suspicious about the intentions of Sinhala leaders on
the eve of independence. One of the circumstances that created much reaction
from the Tamil people was, as they preferred to call it, the "state sponsored
settlement" of Sinhala people by successive governments in the Tamil areas.
The Tamils believed that the settlements were aimed at reducing the Tamil
majority in these two provinces that were considered as fundamental for their
survival as an ethnic group. Consequences of the settlement schemes, the
Tamils feared, will lead to the weakening of their position politically as well as
threaten their existence in the long term.
The Sinhalese, on the other hand, strongly disputed this claim and argued
that it was necessary to establish settlements in order to accommodate the
growing population in the south. The basis of the Sinhalese people's argument
is that it is unfair for a group that represents only twelve percent of the
population to claim nearly one third of the total landscape of the country.
Whatever the arguments by the competing groups, the net effect of the "state
sponsored settlement" in the Northern and Eastern provinces is that it effectively
reduced the Tamil dominance in the eastern province. Also, it broke the
contiguity of Tamil majority areas and thus seriously challenged the homeland

15.
This is not to suggest that these differences have disappeared completely. At a micro-level, one
can still notice that people consciously refer to the cast differences within the Sinhalese society.
16.

The Tamils currently have their demographic strength in the Eastern province.

926

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 8:921

concept and strengthened the threat perception that the Tamils had about their
Sinhalese counterparts.
Threat perception does not only exist among the Tamils. Sinhalese also
possessed a fear of Tamil dominance. The Sinhalese are, in a sense, a majority
with a minority complex. Although the Sinhalese are the majority community
within the state of Sri Lanka, regionally they become a minority to the Tamils:
the Southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu constitutes approximately fifty-five
million Tarnils. 7 Only a narrow water called Palk Strait divides Tamil Nadu
and the northernmost point of Sri Lanka. The Tamils enjoy cultural, linguistic,
as well as religious commonalties with their counterparts in Tamil Nadu.
Interestingly, Tamil Nadu was the first state ever to openly demand separation
from the Republic of India in the early 1960s. Although the separatist
movement disappeared in the late 1960s, Tamil nationalism remained stronger.
Some even suggested that the Tamil Nadu leaders' desire for separation did not
totally fade away.
Relations between the Tamils in Sri Lanka and India were so strong that
the Tamil militant movement in its early days enjoyed tremendous support from
the people of Tamil Nadu. After the ethnic riots of 198318 in Sri Lanka, in
which the Tamils were brutalized, the political leaders in Tamil Nadu competed
among themselves to support the Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka. The killing of
the former Prime Minister of India Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, for which the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was blamed, to a great extent eliminated this
support base. However, the collaboration between Tamils in India and Sri
Lanka brought about a suspicion in the Sinhala psyche: they conceived the
collaboration as a conspiracy to form a greater Tamil Eelam, centered around
the separate state of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese basically
apprehended the creation of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka as a launching pad for
the creation of a greater Tamil state. In the Sinhalese mind, the greater Tamil
state is a direct threat to the Sinhala state and race. The Sinhalese continue to
resist any suggestion for devolution of power-the focal point of any attempt
at conflict resolution- claiming that any devolved power would eventually lead
to the creation of separate Tamil Eelam and greater Tamil state.
IV. HISTORY
History is one of the most debated factors in this conflict. It has been
interpreted by the conflicting parties according to their positions and, to a
greater extent, exploited to strengthen those positions. Analyzing the Tamil
17.
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exploitation of history to justify their demands, Rajanayagam points out that
"the more relations between the two groups deteriorated the more history
became a weapon in the battle to justify Tamil demand for autonomy and, in
principle, independence."' 9 According to Nissan & Stirrat:
Both present the past in terms of the interaction of two opposed
entities, Sinhala and Tamils, who have always been as separate as
they are today. Second, they consist of arguments over events which
allegedly occurred between the fourth century B.C and the tenth
century A.C.D. Third, they present the two communities as
historically and continuously opposed through warfare, joining an
ancient past to the present with no regard for the hiatus of centuries.
Fourth, the histories are both concerned with a "national people's
claim to its own territory. Finally each side presents the other as little
more than barbarians. Both sides in the present political context back
up their respective claims through selective and competitive use of
archaeological evidence." 20
Both parties claim that they are the original people of the island, and the
others are invaders. Although, there is no evidence to prove who the original
inhabitants are or who the first settlers are, one obvious fact that emerged from
the existing theories is that both ethnic groups arrived on the island, probably
from the Indian subcontinent, and settled in different parts. It seems there is no
dispute over the concept that both ethnic groups settled on the island from India.
However, some scholars believe that both groups arrived on the island
approximately the same time. Regardless of the validity, these claims are
providing moral foundations for the nationalist sentiments of both groups, and
there are vicious debates about the rightful ownership of the land in printed
literature as well as in public fora.
In 1815, Sri Lanka was brought under one administration only by the
British. Prior to the arrival of western colonial powers, the island was under the
control of several regional monarchs. For example, when the Portuguese
arrived in 1505, the island constituted three kingdoms: two ruled by Sinhala
kings and one by a Tamil king. The existence of a Tamil kingdom of Jaffna in
the written history of the island provided the basic nucleus for the Tamil
nationalism and still serves as the foundation for demand for the separate state
of Tamil Eelam. On the other hand, the Sinhalese believe that there existed a

19.
Dagmar Hellman-Rajanayagam, The Politicsof Tamil Past, in SRI LANKA: HISTORY AND THE
ROOTS OF CONFLICT 116 (Jonathan Spencer eds.,1990).
20.
Elizabeth Nissan, & R.L. Stirrat, The Generationof Communal Identities, in Sri Lanka: History
and the Roots of Conflict 21 (Jonathan Spencer eds., 1990).
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pre-historic Sinhala kingdom in Sri Lanka that dominated the whole island.
This is also used to justify the Sinhala right to political control.
In addition to its contribution o the nationalist sentiments on both sides,
history also functioned as a source of fear psychology and victimization in the
minds of both ethnic communities. For example, the history of the island
suggests that the Southern Indian rulers from the Indian subcontinent, believed
to be Tamil kings, invaded the island a number of times. There is evidence that
the Chola kingdom was expanded to include parts of the island centuries ago. 2
These arguments were used to depict the Tamils as invaders and to claim that
the Sinhalese were victims of alien Tamil invasion. In the same vein, Tamils
contend that the Sinhalese attempted to ethnically eliminate the Tamils from the
island, even from the ancient time. For example, charging the Sinhala history
as Genocidal, Vanniasingham-an ethnic Tamil-writes in his preface as
follows:
according to Sinhalese chronicles, King Dutta Gemunu waged a Holy
War against the Tamils, with a contingent of five hundred bhikkus
actually accompanying the Army in its campaign. He killed the
thirty-two Tamil sub-kings who acknowledged the suzerainty of King
Ellalan, and ultimately Ellalan also, and established himself at
Anuradhapura. However, in his last days he did not have any peace
of mind: he was worried that his killing millions of Tamils would
debar him from entering Heaven. Ultimately he was consoled by the
Buddhist hierarchy that the Tamils whom he had caused to be killed
had not embraced Buddhism and as such were equivalent only to
beasts; killing them was no sin and thus he would not be debarred
from entering Heaven. Obviously, the "millions of Tamils" does not
refer to soldiers in the battlefield but to innocent civilians. Thus the
Sinhalese records admit a genocidal attack on the Tamils in the
second century before Christ carried on in the name of Lord
Buddha.22
The post-independent history of the country also has the same impact in the
Tamil perception. Some of the laws and public policies formulated by the
Sinhala dominated governments immediately after the independence, making
the Tamils believe that the Sinhalese seek to reduce Tamils to second class
citizens and eventually terminate their existence. For example, one of the first
acts undertaken by the first post-independence government, headed by the late
D. S. Senanayake, was to disenfranchise the "Tamils of recent Indian origin,"
21.
R.A.L.H. Gunawardana, The People of Lion: The Sinhala Identity and Ideology in History and
Historiography,in SRI LANKA: HISTORY AND THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT 45-86 (Jonathan Spencer, ed. 1990).
22.
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who are also called Estate Tamils. Although there are social differences
between the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Indian Tamils, they share a similar
culture, same language and religion.
The Indian Tamils were brought to the Island by the British to labor in the
tea industry, mainly in the central region of the country.23 Presence of Indian
Tamils-who formed nearly seven percent of the total population-later posed
a threat to the Sinhalese people as well as the ruling United National Party
(UNP) Government. While the local Sinhalese people felt that the Indian
Tamils were taking over their land, the ruling UNP, which is capitalist in core,
considered them politically unfavorable because the Indian Tamils tended to
vote with the leftist parties.24 Therefore, the government intended to kill two
birds with one stone and introduced the Citizenship Acts of 1948-49, which
essentially made the Indian Tamils a stateless people.25
The effect of this act on ethnic relations was that the Ceylon Tamils
conceived this action as a step towards Sinhala dominance against all minorities,
especially against the Ceylon Tamils. Although the predominant Tamil party
at that time, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) headed by late G.G.
Ponnambalam, failed to oppose the Citizenship Act, Ponnambalam's deputy
Chelvanayagam did.26 Chelvanayagam split from the ACTC and formed a new
political party called the Federal Party (FP), which soon became the spearhead
of Tamil nationalism and its demand for regional autonomy. When the Federal
Party was warning the Tamil people of the move towards Sinhala domination
by successive governments, the Sinhala Only Act was introduced strengthening
the argument that the Tamils were made second-class citizens in their own
7
2

land.

The 1956 Sinhala Only Act was a direct result of the election pledge made
by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) that was formed by S.W.R.D.
Bandaranaike, who defected from the UNP in the early 1950s. During the 1956
election for the national parliament, Bandaranaike promised the Sinhala people
that if he were given a chance to form the government he would make Sinhala
the only official language of the country. He kept his promise after a
resounding victory in the election.28 The Sinhala Only Act required the public
employees to qualify in the Sinhala language if they wanted to continue in their
23.

Perera, supra note 10.

24.
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positions. This Act, though, affected all non-Sinhala speaking (minority)
groups, and it had serious repercussion for Tamils, who dominated the public
sector employment.
In addition to ensuring the "rightful position" of the Sinhala people in the
national life, the Act was intended to reduce the Tamil dominance in the public
sector employment. It effectively fulfilled that expectation. "With the
implementation of Sinhala as the language of government," Mitra and Lewis
claim, "the specter of Tamils being denied jobs in the government service and
of Tamils losing their cultural heritage to the Sinhalese began to spread
throughout the Tamil Community."29 The Tamils felt that by enacting the
Sinhala Only Act, the government successfully pushed the Tamil language to
an inferior position in terms of its relevance to national affairs.30
The Tamil writers, most often than not, cite state-sponsored colonization
schemes as one of the major milestones in the inimical relationship between
these two communities. The Tamil community looked at the colonization
schemes as a conspiracy to divide their paramount position in the Northern and
Eastern provinces. Colonization of Sinhalese peasantry in the North-central and
Eastern provinces was launched almost immediately after independence, with
the Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake leading the campaign. It was argued that
the colonization was imperative for the agricultural development of the country
as well as for accommodating the fast-growing population in the south by
successive governments. 3' However, one major but hidden aim was to reduce
the demographic dominance of the Tamil-speaking people in the Northern and
Eastern provinces. Referring to the impact of colonization schemes, the most
senior leaders of TULF (Mr. S. Sivasithamparam and Mr. A. Amirthalingam)
claimed that "serious inroads have been made into these homelands by policy
of planned colonization with Sinhalese carried out by successive Sinhala
governments since independence. 32 The contiguous nature of these provinces
supported the Tamil claim that these provinces were their homeland and formed
the foundation of the proposed Tamil region.
By indulging in massive colonization schemes of Sinhala people in a
region called Manallaaru or Welioya, the governments were successful in
breaking this contiguous nature. Manallaaruor Welioya is still considered to
be a highly strategic move by the government in its war against the LTTE.
Nevertheless, the colonization programs strengthened the Tamil perception of
29.
See generally SUBRATA K. MrrRA &R. ALLISON LEWIS, SUB-NATIONAL MOVEMENTS INSOUTH
ASIA 44 (1996).
30.

De Silva, supra note 18.

31.

Mitra & Lewis, supra note 29.

32.
The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was the prominent democratic party representing
the Tamils in the parliament in the 1960s and 1970s. See, TULF, supra note 4, at 19.
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a "Sinhala conspiracy" to ethnically cleanse Sri Lanka, to make the Tamil
people extinct, and to occupy the Tamil homeland.
Therefore, the history of this island has not only been used by parties to the
conflict according to their interpretations, and to a greater extent to strengthen
their positions, but it has also helped to reinforce their fears about the other
ethnic group. Fear in turn forced the parties to take extreme measures in order
to ensure their safety and, in a sense, their survival. The Tamil decision to lead
a violent campaign against the State of Sri Lanka and many State policies
against the minorities can be explained in terms of fear psychology.
V. ECONOMICS

Economics play a significant role in many modem ethnic and other deeprooted conflicts.33 The Sri Lankan conflict is no exception, as economic factors
contributed vastly for the origin and development of the conflict as well as the
escalation of violence. The economic facet of the conflict can be traced to the
colonial period, especially to the British rule. When the British attempted to fill
their administration in Sri Lanka with local white workers, who were
considerably cheaper compared to their white counterparts on the island, the
Tamils-particularly Jaffna Tamils-were in a favorable position to occupy
public sector employment.' This was because of the educational advantages
the Tamils had over their Sinhala counterparts. The Jaffna Tamils benefited
immensely from American missionary activities centered on Jaffna during the
colonial period.35 At the initial stage, Sinhalese were not enthusiastic about
English education, partly for religious reasons. Therefore, over the course of
time, the Sinhalese were not able to compete with the Tamils for public sector
employment. Commentators point out that at the time of independence the civil
service had a disproportionate number of Tamils in it, especially at its higher
ranks. Tamils comprised about 30 percent of the upper levels of the civil
service while comprising only 22.7 percent of the population in the 1946 census.
The Sinhalese comprised 69.4 percent of the population and 57.6 percent of the
upper levels of the civil service.36
The Sinhalese, however, conceived this state of affairs as the British
favoring the minority over the majority. This was understood in terms of the
British policy of "divide and rule" and Tamil collaboration with colonialists.
Naturally this perception fueled Sinhala animosity against the Tamils.
33.

SEAN BYRNE & CYNTHIA L. IRVIN, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES:

TURNING POINTS IN

ETHNOPOLITICAL CONFLICTS 107 (2000).

34.

See generally, BUDDHADASA

HEWAVITHARANA,

ECONOMIC

CONSEQUENCES

DEVOLUTION PACKAGE AND AN EVALUATION OF DECENTRALIZATION (1997).
35.

See generally, DAVID LrTLE, SRI LANKA: THE INVENTION OF ENMITY (1994).

36.

MITRA & LEWIS, supra note 29, at 148.
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However, the Tamils continued to dominate public sector employment even
after independence. According to Rajanayagam, the Tamils had found their
living mainly in government service and the professions, and education was said
to be Jaffna's major "industry." The soil there is ard and can be made fertile
only with a lot of hard work. Even then it does not support the population, and
as a result the youth are dependent on civil service jobs and the professions for
a living. Under British rule, this had indeed led to a certain over-representation
of Tamils in these sectors, particularly because the Sinhalese resisted the
mission-based education more than the Tamils and were involved in trade and
commerce to a greater extent.37
Nevertheless, the Sinhalese conceived the Tamil dominance of public
sector employment as a "historic injustice" committed against their race by the
colonial masters with the assistance of the Tamil minorities.38 With
independence literally transferring state power from the British to the Sinhalese
political leaders, the Sinhalese were in a comfortable position to compensate
themselves for past "injustice.
Measures were introduced to ensure the
interests of the Sinhalese community both within the legislative framework of
the state and under the guise of public policy.
Unfortunately, these measures were proved to be detrimental to the
aspirations of the minority communities. The language policies were of the
utmost of importance in this regard. The 1956 Sinhala Only Act was, among
other things, a major blow for the economic survival of the Jaffna Tamils
because it required public sector employees to qualify in Sinhala language
within a stipulated period. Tens of thousands of Tamils lost their employment
as a result. Sinhala was further upgraded to be the language of the courts soon
after.'
What the Sri Lankan government called "standardization" was introduced
in 1972 as an education policy to help Sinhala students obtain the bulk of the
admissions to the universities. Essentially, standardization "meant that students
from the Tamil stream had to have disproportionately higher entrance exam
marks than those from the Sinhalese stream to get a place in the university. This
was openly designed to reduce the allegedly over-representation of Tamils in the
universities."'"
In addition, Rajanayagam points out that it was the
standardization policy that "hit the (Tamil) youth hardest, and it can be said that
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it triggered the subsequent violent conflict, because it virtually foreclosed their
42
future.
The policy of "nationalization," which was characterized as
"Sinhalesization" by the Tamils, also had the same effect on the economic
survival of the Tamil population. The S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike's government
introduced the nationalization process, and large number of institutions,
including commercial establishments and educational organizations, were
brought under the patronage of the government. According to Rupesinghe,
[w]ith the electoral victory of the SLFP in 1956, the pursuit of
Sinhalese hegemony was provided with political power. This was
used to introduce legislation against colonial economic interests, and
to create the conditions for the Sinhalesization of the state. These
policies are reflected particularly in language policy through the
Sinhala Only Act, but also in other spheres such as education,
employment, and land colonization."3
These policies put the Tamils in a strongly disadvantaged position in
competitions for employment in those institutions. Not only the business and
educational establishments but also the state organs were radically
"Sinhalesized" during Bandaranaike era and after. For example, the state's
armed forces were filled with members of the Sinhala community. "From 1970
there was virtually no Tamil recruitment into the armed forces." Even today,
these institutions remain very much Sinhala establishments.45
The resulting lack of economic opportunities not only frustrated the Tamil
community, particularly the youth, but also forced them to think about
alternatives that would ensure their power and development. At that point of
time a separate state seemed a viable alternative. The Tamils also realized,
probably from past experience, that only a violent campaign could help create
such a state. The decision to take up arms was made at the height of the
frustration among Tamil youth. Frustration leads to aggression.' This was
proved to be true in the Sri Lankan Tamil case.
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VI. POLrncs

The political facet of Social Cubism includes constitutional as well as
institutional factors, including party politics, in contributing to the evolution of
ethnic conflicts. In Sri Lanka all these factors were involved in the increasing
dissatisfaction of the Tamils towards the Sri Lankan State and the enmity
between the two conflicting groups.
The 1946 Soulbury Constitution provided the foundation for the
independence of the country in 1948. Although local concerns were taken into
consideration, the Soulbury constitution was essentially designed by the British
and was in effect until 1972. 47 In 1972 the new First Republican Constitution
replaced this constitution.
The Soulbury constitution provided some
constitutional safeguards for the minorities because the Tamil had already began
to raise their voices against Sinhala dominance in the body politics of the
country. For example, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), the chief
political party representing the Tamil people, put forward a proposal popularly
known as "50:50." This proposal advocated a constitutional arrangement that
would ensure that fifty percent of the parliamentary seats to go to all the
minorities.48 First, it did not conform to liberal democratic principles. On the
other hand, the majority Sinhalese immediately rejected it. Therefore, this
proposal enjoyed no major support at that time.
However, as mentioned elsewhere, the Soulbury constitution provided
number of safeguards to the minorities against majority dominance. For
example, Article 29 "specifically denied authority to the Parliament to make
laws discriminatory against or in favor of any particular community. The Privy
Council observed that this was an entrenched clause in that it was not within the
power of the Parliament to amend or repeal the said clause. '49 Meanwhile, a
Second Chamber (Senate) was also created in the parliament in order to, among
other objectives, accommodate minority opinions.50 Also the constitution
ensured that the state would remain secular because it is a multi-religious
community. Effectiveness of these arrangements was a subject of discussion,
because the principles were violated on several instances. For example, the
1956 Sinhala Only Act was passed in the parliament in spite of the fact that the
constitution did not allow any legislation that favored only one racial or
religious community (Article 29).i
47.
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The First Republican Constitution of 1972 did not include Article 29, and
it also abolished the second chamber in the parliament. This constitution made
the country a unitary state.52 Buddhism was constitutionally given the foremost
place, and the First Republican Constitution placed the responsibility on the
state "to protect and foster Buddhism."53 Sinhala was retained as the only
official language of the state. These features of the new constitution reinforced
the Tamil view that they were made second-class citizens within the country.
The 1978 constitution did not make any major changes to these controversial
features except for language policy. Tamil was recognized as one of the
national languages in this constitution.'
Referring to the arrangement on
Buddhism, Warnapala claims that "Chapter 11, which deals with Buddhism, is
more or less the same as in the 1972 Constitution except that the word
'Sasana'-the Buddhist dispensation - is included. The use of this traditional
(Sinhala) description makes the chapter on Buddhism more effective."55
An important characteristic of these republican constitutions is that they
centralized the state's power to a greater extent both administratively as well as
politically. Manor and Segal point out that "although Sri Lanka had an open,
representative political system based on universal suffrage as far back as 1931,
power was still grossly over-centralized. No representative institutions existed
at any intermediate level between parliament in Colombo and the local level."5
Such a political environment left the Tamils with no power over either
national affairs or their regional issues, because policymaking was and has been
controlled from Colombo. Following the nonviolent struggle waged by the
Federal Party led by S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, two pacts were signed.57 The first
was made between Prime Minister Bandaranayake and Chelvanayagam in 1957,
and the second between Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake and
Chelvanayagam in 1965. The Banda-Chelva pact, as it is called, provided for
devolution of power on the basis of Regional Councils. The Dudley-Chelva
pact also agreed that the District Councils would be the principle unites for
devolution. Unfortunately both these agreements were unilaterally scrapped by
the respective governments, forcing the Tamils to lose any faith they had in
reaching agreements with Sri Lanka's governments.58

52.

W. A. Wiswa Wamapala, Sri Lanka's New Constitution, in XX ASIAN SURVEY 9, 914-930

53.

Perera, supra note 10.

54.

Warnapala,supranote 52.

55.

Id. at 917.

56.

Manor & Segal, supra note 45.

57.

Willson,supra note 7.

58.

Loganathan, supra note 27.

(1980).

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 8:921

936

The nature of party politics in the country also helped escalate the tension
between these communities. Two major parties, namely the United National
Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), represent the majority
of Sinhala people. Both parties can be labeled as "Sinhala parties" in spite of
the meager support they enjoy among the Tamil and Muslim populations,
because their support base is predominately Sinhala. 59 The Sri Lankan Tamils
were represented first by the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) and then by
Federal Party (FP). The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) was formed in
the early 1970s as a combined force of Tamil people and enjoyed overwhelming
support of the Tamils in Northern and Eastern provinces.6 ° While Muslim
people tend to vote with the so-called national parties (the UNP and the SLFP),
the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) has represented them since the mid1980s. The Indian Tamils predominantly supported the Ceylon Workers
Congress (CWC), and its support base has been confined to tea estates in central
Sri Lanka as well as areas where people of Indian origin live densely. As one
can conceive, party politics in Sri Lanka has been sharply divided along ethnic
as well as religious loyalties. 6
This trend undoubtedly encouraged the political parties and their
candidates to extensively employ ethnic and religious slogans in order to win
the numbers game, which is an essential part of liberal democracy. Most often,
ethnic and religious slogans turned against the "other" communities, and the
"others" were depicted as foes. In fact, the political parties were competing to
offer the strongest possible measure against the other communities if they were
elected to power. The 1956 Sinhala Only Act, for example, was originally an
election promise made by the SLFP.62 When the UNP also endorsed the one
language policy, the SLFP leader promised the Sinhala people "Sinhala only
because (according to Vanniasingham)
within twenty-four hours"
"Bandaranaike found that 'Sinhala only within twenty-four hours' would be the
sure-fire-vote catcher.,

63

Tamil parties, too, comprehensively manipulated racial slogans against
Sinhala people and the state, particularly in Tamil majority areas. Thus, the
resolution for a separate state of Tamil Eelam came into force as an election
promise. Siriweera points out that "according to the TULF's election manifesto
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[of 1976] the question to be resolved was whether the Tamils wanted their
freedom or continued servitude to the Sinhala-dominated government."' This
sort of shortsighted "vision" of political parties in this country helped only to
increase the vacuum between the conflicting communities.
VII. CIVILZATION
At least in their minds, the Sinhalese and the Tamils are two different
groups of people originating from different civilizations. The conventional
wisdom is that the Sinhalese are descendants of a north Indian Aryan race and
the Tamils are Dravidians, whose geographical base is in South India. It is
imperative to note that there exists an interesting academic discourse which
advances a number of theories regarding the origin and inter-relations of these
groups. For example, some scholars suggest that the Sinhalese and the Tamils
are descendants of same racial stock, probably Dravidian, and others maintain
that the Sinhalese are in fact descendants of aboriginal people called Veddas
who still live in small numbers in the remote mountain areas of Sri Lanka. Yet,
these academic debates in reality do not make any substantial changes in the
perceptions one group holds about the other, which are fundamentally negative.
Moreover, there are obvious differences between these groups. The
Sinhalese speak Sinhala and most of them are Buddhist. The Tamils, on the
other hand, speak Tamil and are predominantly Hindus. There is a Christian
community that includes both Sinhalese as well as Tamil. The common factor
of Christianity failed to make any impact in bridging the gap between the
ethnically different antagonists, because the Sinhala Christians and the Tamil
Christians feel emotional proximity to Buddhism and Hinduism, respectively.
This emotional attachment is based on their ethnic loyalties as well as on
cultural appreciation of those religions. This trend has even influenced some
Tamil Christians and Sinhala Christians to declare that they are culturally
Hindus and Buddhists, respectively.
Nevertheless, the religious aspect of the conflict is somewhat complicated.
It is safe to assume that this conflict is essentially an ethnic one rather than
religious, even though the groups entangled are religiously different. To a
certain extent, religious factors are involved. The Tamil language and Hinduism
are not intertwined to the same degree as Sinhala language and Buddhism. For
the Sinhalese community, their language and religion are one and the same. In
other words, one cannot survive without the other. Rupesinghe points out that
"the Buddhist revival was associated with the conception of the Sinhalese as an
'Aryan' race, and that Buddhism and Sinhalese were synonymous with each
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other."6 5 Sinhala Buddhism is the foundation of Sinhalese survival and wellbeing, and it is an integral part of Sinhalese identity. The Sinhalese believe that
Buddha himself chose the island of Sri Lanka as a place where his teaching
would flourish.66 Therefore, it is the inviolable duty of the Sinhalese people to
protect Buddhism in the land. Moreover, the Sinhalese also argue that the
"Sinhala Buddhism" could be protected only in a unitary Sri Lanka. This
argument is based on the presumption that any form of devolution of power will
separation of the country and cause the destruction of
eventually lead to the
67
Sinhala Buddhism.
Tamil nationalism, on the other hand, does not represent a strong
association with Hinduism. That may be one reason for the overwhelming
support the separatist war extracts from Christian's particularly Catholic masses
in the war zone. The Tamil Catholic Church is highly critical of the Sri Lankan
government for the manner in which the Tamil people were and are treated in
the Northern and Eastern provinces. For their part, the Sinhala hard-liners in the
south accuse the Tamil Catholic Church of assisting the LTTE.
VIII. PSYCHOLOGY

In the final analysis, what is important is the psychology of the people who
are involved in a highly intense violent ethnic conflict. The "fear of extinction"
plays a major role in pushing the people to extreme violence in many modem
ethnic conflicts. Reiterer believes that this "fear of extinction" is fueled often
by memories of century-old massacres and other horrible events in the history
of mutual relations.68 Groups have a "chosen trauma" that assists in the
mobilization of their constituents. 69 This is true for the Sri Lankan situation as
well.
There is a fear of total extinction in both Tamil and Sinhalese psyches,
which is rightly called "crisis of confidence" by students of Sri Lankan
politics.7" Both groups lost faith that they can peacefully coexist within one
system or even side by side. This fear is the fundamental reason for the
Sinhalese desire to maintain tight control over the Tamil people and their affairs.
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Any effort to devolve powers to regional units or share power with their Tamil
counterparts is resisted on the premise that such a situation will lead to the
creation of separate Tamil Eelam and eventually cause the destruction of
Sinhala Buddhist race. The belief that there is a Tamil conspiracy to establish
a greater Tamil Eelam remains very strong in the Sinhala psyche.7'
On the other hand, the Tamils believe that Sinhalese have reduced the
Tamils to a second-class citizenry, primarily by using political power and
imposing hegemonic policies over Tamil affairs. Examples of such tendencies
are often cited from the distorted versions of Tamil history and culture in school
textbooks to what is termed the "military occupation" of Sinhala armed forces
in the North and East. Legislation and public policies affecting Tamil are seen
as tools to reduce their presence in mainstream politics. The Tamil are
convinced that all these oppressive policies will eventually lead to the extinction
of their identity and people as an ethnic group. For them the only way to avoid
such a predicament is to have the right to self-determination, or at least total
control over their own affairs. Several options, including the creation of a
separate state and the introduction of a federal structure, have been put forward
on this supposition.
Therefore, the final positions of these groups are naturally diametrically
opposed to each other. Fundamentally, the Sinhalese want to maintain the
existing unitary status of the state, which ensures the central government's
control of power over all units and levels. The Tamils want to create a unit that
would ensure their survival and well being, be it within a separate state or a
federal structure. This is where both the groups are stuck and are unable to
move towards a peaceful solution. The nineteen-year-long war has proved that
each parties lacks the power to impose a military solution on the other.72
Therefore, an end to the war must be achieved through political dialogue.
However the ground situation in the country does not provide any cause for
hope, at least in the sort term. It seems that a change toward a peaceful
resolution to the conflict is not possible without a strikingly major change in the
political milieu of the conflict setting.
IX.

CONCLUSION

As in many other ethnic conflicts, the Sri Lankan conflict too evolved out
of soft political demands into an all-out war. The civil war has so far claimed
more than sixty thousand lives, in addition to causing damage to tremendous
number of economic resources. Social and political institutions were not
immune from the destruction, either. A negotiated political settlement is of
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utmost importance to insure a peaceful resolution with justice to all groups
involved. A just solution cannot be achieved without a proper understanding
of the multiple dynamics. of the conflict. Sri Lankan conflict, although
essentially an ethnic one, it is multi-dimensional.
We have already discussed in great detail the various factors involved in
the conflict and their impacts on the other factors. We have examined, for
example, how the historical factors have influenced the psychology of the
parties, and how the psychology had an impact on the policymaking in terms of
economics, politics, and the decision to use violence in order to achieve goals.
The Social Cubism theory of conflict allows us to examine varied facets of a
conflict by providing a multi-dimensional framework. In this sense, it is a
useful framework for conflict analysis and can be applied to any deep-rooted
ethnic conflicts.

